• wherever possible obtain independent confirmation of the facts
• encourage substantive debate on the subject by knowledgeable persons
• spin more than one hypothesis
• ensure that every link in a chain of argument works, not just most of them

The baloney detection kit also includes extensive advice on what not to do. It is based upon fallacies of logic and rhetoric, some simple, others more complex. My personal favorite among them is misunderstanding the nature of statistics, with Sagan’s example of President Dwight Eisenhower "expressing astonishment and alarm on discovering that fully half of all Americans have below average intelligence."

I had occasion to revisit Sagan’s baloney detection kit in the context of reading The Skeptical Environmentalist, a book by Danish statistician Björn Lomborg. Lomborg’s book has attracted remarkable negative comment from the scientific community, juxtaposed with positive gushes from the popular press. The Washington Post calls it "the most significant work on the environment since the appearance of its polar opposite, Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring, in 1962" (Dutton 2001). Similar kudos are offered by The Economist. In contrast, there has been a plethora of negative reviews of the book in scientific journals, including the heavyweights Nature, which calls it "deeply flawed" (Pimm and Harvey 2001), and Science, which disapproves of Lomborg’s selective use of data (Grubb 2001). Other negative reviews have appeared in more specialized science journals, such as Environment (Gleick 2001) and World Watch (Bell 2002). Among the most vociferous critics has been Scientific American, which countered with its own debunking article (Rennie 2002), including rebuttals by a coterie of scientific heavyweights, all of whom refute Lomborg’s claims.

The gist of the scientific feedback against Lomborg is that he displays wilful ignorance, quotes selectively from the works of others, and, perhaps above all else, courts the attention of media that accept his work at face value, in an uncritical manner (Wilson 2001). The oddity is that the book, while claiming to be a skeptical review of a wide body of "doomsaying" environmental studies, should itself be subject to a healthy dose of skepticism. A reasonable layperson is likely to look askance at Lomborg’s claims that virtually every environmental indicator is better than scientists claim, including world hunger, global warming, forest depletion, species extinction, loss of nonrenewables, acid rain, as well as water, air, and wastewater pollution. A reasonable person is also likely to view with marked disbelief Lomborg’s claims that all that bad news is the result of a directed and concerted cabal of environmental pressure groups to conceal the truth. In a nutshell, the truth may be out there . . . but not in this book.

How then do we explain the ability of someone who has admitted having no scientific training or expertise comparable to those he attacks to attract such favorable press? Canadian scientist David Suzuki suggests that it is because Lomborg assuages guilt about ecological problems (Suzuki 2002). In contrast to current United Nations reports which paint a pretty dismal picture about the state of the environment, Lomborg tells us what we prefer to hear: namely that things are a lot better than pessimistic scientists would have us believe.

More important than all of this, from the Skeptical Inquirer's point of view, is finding the answer to Lomborg’s success through his use of the toolkit advice offered in Demon-Haunted World. By that advice, I refer specifically to things Sagan warns us not to do. The Skeptical Environmentalist is a textbook example of the anti-science toolkit in action. As such, it is extremely illustrative. Here are some of those tools and how they have been (ab)used, chosen (due to length restrictions) from a single chapter in Lomborg’s book which deals with biodiversity.

Straw Man

According to Sagan, a straw man fallacy is "caricaturing a position to make it easier to attack." Lomborg uses a more subtle variation on this theme, by finding an early, erroneous or exaggerated scientific viewpoint, and then treating it as though it were still mainstream. In particular, he quotes from the work of a scientist who stated in 1979 that we could be losing something in the order of 40,000 species a year to human-driven extinction. To increase the caricature, Lomborg reprints the 40,000 species number on an X-Y graph so that the 40,000 figure spikes up like a sore thumb from a near-zero baseline from the years 1600-2000. Lomborg states that this "is a figure which with monotonous regularity has been repeated everywhere until in the end we all believed it." The problem is, it hasn't, and we don't (Lovejoy 2002). However, by emphasizing that 40,000 figure again and again, Lomborg tars with the same brush other, more current studies which still show an alarming loss in biodiversity over time.

In creating his straw man, Lomborg also engages another of the anti-science tools, observational selection. Sagan describes this as enumerating favorable circumstances by counting hits and avoiding misses. Lomborg refers to the 40,000 number repeatedly, without referring to the body of work of the scientist in question, carried out in eighty-plus published papers over the course of a twenty-year period (Myers 2001).

In Demon-Haunted World, Sagan talks frankly about himself, and other scientists, who occasionally get it wrong. The truth is, scientists make mistakes. Among those Sagan himself acknowledges was his belief that when Iraq torched Kuwaiti oil wells in 1991, the smoke might be enough to disrupt agriculture. While it did get dark at noon, and while Persian Gulf temperatures did drop several degrees, not enough smoke reached the stratosphere to cause serious long-term disruption. Sagan got it wrong (thank goodness).

Unfortunately, when a scientist is premature in making conclusions, or is simply wrong in the published literature, the paper stays around, bound somewhere on a library shelf, where it can be quoted many years later, as Lomborg has done. Never mind that there are more current figures: a past mistake may have been found, and thus the whole body of literature respecting biodiversity loss is suspect. This also illustrates two more of Sagan’s anti-science tools: slippery slope, whereby letting even one, possibly exaggerated species-loss figure slide by without trashing the entire field may lead to complete chaos, and suppressed evidence, or half truths, wherein a claim that has been "caught out as poorly supported" is trumpeted with appropriate fanfare, at the same time as other claims in the same area are swept under the carpet, or given short shrift.

Argument from Authority

In the context of Lomborg’s book, arguing from authority means garnering support from leaders in the field, especially if their support for you can be given without revealing their own existing prejudice in favor of your point of view. The English language version of Lomborg’s book includes a number of favorable comments by various researchers reprinted on the covers. Most noticeable of these is the praise of researcher Matt Ridley. The words "a brilliant and powerful book," appear in big, bold print on the front cover, above the book’s title, being a quote from "Matt Ridley, author of Genome." Ridley is no slouch in the science field, and it would be tempting to conclude that his praise is high praise indeed from an impartial genetics researcher. Unfortunately, what isn't stated anywhere in The Skeptical Environmentalist is that Ridley is also a past editor of The Economist, and is very much a believer that economic progress can go hand in hand with environmental improvement. This is in fact a very contentious view, and is opposed by many in the field of sustainable development. How do we know Ridley believes this? Because he says so himself, in a followup letter in support of Lomborg published in Scientific American (Ridley 2002). Ridley may be right in encouraging a stronger linkage between economic development and sustainability, but that’s not the point. Many people will see his support on the cover of The Skeptical Environmentalist, but only as the author of a popular book on genetics, and therefore out of context.

Ad Hominem Attacks

Lomborg decries what he perceives to be a number of personal attacks on himself in the myriad reviews that conflict with his own point of view. That may be in part a misplaced perception on the part of anyone who is an inexperienced gladiator in the scientific arena. As Sagan points out in Demon-Haunted World, scientists aren't there to be the friends of new theorists. They are there to test new views, to challenge them, to ensure that they are robust. However, Lomborg himself slips into the tactic of attacking the arguer, rather than the argument, when he states in his biodiversity chapter that the basis of opinion of biologists’ arguments is that "there are many grants at stake."

Inconsistency

An example of the inconsistency principle, described in The Demon-Haunted World, is the belief that it is "reasonable for the Universe to continue to exist forever into the future, but judge absurd the possibility that it has infinite duration into the past." This is arguably the most oft-repeated complaint lodged against Lomborg’s book. In addition to selective use of data, critics argue that Lomborg is inconsistent in his use of global or regional trends, and switches from one to the other where it pleases his argument. This produces interesting results when talking about percentages. Remember our "40,000 species a year" scientist? Lomborg is determined not to let him off the hook, and repeats this number several times in his biodiversity chapter. However, whenever Lomborg talks about the "true" state of biodiversity loss, he consistently expresses it as a percentage, or rate of loss. His reason for doing so is because that is the way biodiversity loss is measured these days. If so, however, why keep trotting out that old 40,000 species a year figure? Lomborg trumpets his own figure of 0.7 percent species loss per fifty years, with a sigh of relief. Things aren't as bad as we have been told. But with his own acceptance of current species numbers, Lomborg’s estimate would still amount to thousands of species lost every year.

It just doesn't sound as bad when it’s expressed as a rate of loss. This begs the question: should society be any less galvanized to take action against a biodiversity loss of several thousand, as opposed to scores of thousands of species annually? Apparently so, according to Lomborg, who considers that losing 0.7 percent of all species per fifty years is a lot rosier than 40,000 species a year. Thank goodness for percentages!

As you can see from the above analysis, people like Lomborg can get quite a bit of mileage debunking science. The anti-science tools I've mentioned are just a few in the larger collection Sagan sets out in The Demon-Haunted World. They can be quite fun to use, as a destructive exercise. Earlier in the last century, for example, we could have had a good crack at Einstein, on the basis of his lousy school record, paucity of published papers, unexplained holes in his work, such as the existence of dark matter, and that unusual, funky hairdo. Anyone who uses c as a mnemonic for the velocity of light must be seriously unstuck.

On a more serious note, I wish I could conclude by saying that Lomborg’s book has had some benefit to science, perhaps by way of emphasizing the need for robustness in modeling, or the need for critical evaluation of data. As it happens, those already are central tenets of scientific inquiry, as they have been throughout the history of environmental debate. All that Lomborg has accomplished is to try, without much success, to expose the soft underbelly of science. That underbelly is the uncertainty that invariably accompanies the initial investigations of natural and physical phenomena. That’s why the study of problems like global warming is so easy to attack. There is now general consensus that global warming is a genuine phenomenon, but the uncertainty among studies as to its scope and speed provide more than enough ammunition for those determined to seek weaknesses in the arguments, and thus dither away while the problem intensifies.

Unfortunately, the only groups that will be served by Lomborg’s book will be the pro-development and anti-environmental lobbies. No doubt they've been clamoring for a "feel good" book like this, after all the bad news. I've already seen the book trotted out at globalization meetings hosted by private interest groups favoring free trade. In sum, I'd give Lomborg’s book a pass. Go to the public library and check out Demon-Haunted World instead.

References

• Bell, R.C. 2002. Media sheep. World Watch March/April:11-13.
• Dutton, D. 2001. Greener than you think. The Washington Post, 21 October 2001, p. 01.
• Grubb, M. 2001. Relying on Mana from Heaven? Science 294: 1285-87.
• Gleick, P.H. 2002. Is the Skeptic all wet? Environment 44(6): 36-40.
• Lomborg, B. 2001. The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
• Lovejoy, T. 2002. Biodiversity: dismissing scientific process. Scientific American, January: 67-69.
• Myers, N. 2001. Specious: On Björn Lomborg and species diversity. website. Date posted: 12 December 2001.
• Pimm, S., and J. Harvey. 2001. No need to worry about the future. Nature 414: 149-50.
• Rennie, J. 2002. Misleading math about the Earth: Science defends itself against The Skeptical Environmentalist. Scientific American January: 59, with additional articles by S. Schneider, J.P. Holdren, J. Bongaarts, and T. Lovejoy.
• Ridley, M. Letter to the editor. 2002. Scientific American May: 8.
• Sagan, C. 1996. The Demon-Haunted World: Science as a Candle in the Dark. Hodder Headline: London.
• Suzuki, D. 2002. Time to pull our heads out of the sand. website. Date posted: 13 June 2002.
• Wilson, E.O. 2001. Vanishing point: On Björn Lomborg and extinction. website. Date posted: 12 December 2001.

"Talking" Animals

Alleged animal prodigies—various "educated," "talking," and "psychic" creatures—have long been exhibited. In seventeenth-century France, for instance, a famous "talking" horse named Morocco seemed to possess such remarkable powers, including the ability to do mathematical calculations, that he was charged with "consorting with the Devil." However, he saved his own and his master’s life when he knelt, seemingly repentant, before church authorities.

In the latter eighteenth century a "Learned Pig" and a "Wonderful Intelligent Goose" appeared in London. The porker spelled names, solved arithmetic problems, and even read thoughts by selecting, from flashcards, words thought of by audience members (Jay 1986). The goose, advertised as "The greatest Curiosity ever witnessed," performed such feats as divining a selected playing card, discovering secretly selected numbers, and telling time "to a Minute" by a spectator’s own watch (Christopher 1962, 35).

Other prodigies were Munito the celebrated dog, Toby "The Sapient Pig" (who could "Discover a Person’s Thoughts"), and a "scientific" Spanish pony who shared billing with "Two Curious Birds." The latter were "much superior in knowledge to the Learned Pig" and "the first of the kind ever seen in the World." Such animals typically performed their feats by stamping a hoof or paw a certain number of times or by spelling out answers using alphabet and number cards (Christopher 1962; Jay 1986).

In 1904 a German horse named Clever Hans provoked an investigation into his wonderful abilities. "Learned professors were convinced," wrote Milbourne Christopher (1970, 46), "that Hans could work out his own solutions to mathematical problems and had a better knowledge of world affairs than most fourteen-year-old children." However, psychologist Oskar Pfungst soon determined that questioners—including Hans’s trainer—were providing unintentional cueing. Pfungst discovered that Hans began stamping when the questioner leaned forward to observe the horse’s hoof and only stopped when that person relaxed after the correct number was given. Pfungst even played the role of Hans by rapping with his hand while friends posed questions. Of twenty-five questioners, all but two gave the beginning and ending cue without being aware of doing so (Christopher 1970; Sebeok 1986).

Of course, trainers could deliberately cue their animals and practice other deceptions, such as secretly gleaning information that the animal would then reveal "psychically." In 1929, the man who later coined the term ESP, Dr. J.B. Rhine, was taken in by a supposedly telepathic horse named Lady Wonder. Rhine believed Lady actually had psychic power and he set up a tent near her Virginia barn so he could scientifically study her apparent abilities. Lady was trained to operate a contraption—somewhat like an enlarged typewriter—consisting of an arrangement of levers that activated alphabet cards. Lady would sway her head over the levers, then nudge one at a time with her nose to spell out answers to queries (Christopher 1970; Jay 1986).

Magician Milbourne Christopher (1970) had an opportunity to assess Lady’s talents on a visit in 1956. As a test, Christopher gave Lady’s trainer, Mrs. Claudia Fonda, a false name, "John Banks." (The real Banks had exhibited the "talking" horse, Morocco, mentioned earlier.) When Christopher subsequently inquired of Lady, "What is my name?," the mare obligingly nudged the levers to spell out B-A-N-K-S.

Another test involved writing down numbers which Lady then divined. Given a narrow pad and a long pencil, Christopher suspected Mrs. Fonda might be using a professional mentalists’ technique known as "pencil reading," which involves subtly observing the movements of the pencil to learn what was written. So he pretended to write a bold "9" but, while going through the motions, only touched the paper on the downstroke to produce a "1." Although he concentrated on the latter number, Lady indicated the answer was 9.

In short, as the noted magician and paranormal investigator observed, Mrs. Fonda gave a "slight movement" of her training rod whenever Lady’s head was at the correct letter. That was enough to cue the swaying mare to stop and nudge that lever. Thus, Lady was revealed to be a well-trained animal, not a telepathic one (Christopher 1970; Nickell 1989). No doubt the same was true of her predecessors, whose exhibitors were often performing magicians.

In one case a "talking" animal was allegedly just that: a mongoose who spoke in complete sentences. Gef, as he was called, not only spoke English but many foreign phrases as well. He appeared in 1931 on the Irving farm on the Isle of Man (in the Irish Sea) but was never reliably seen. Instead, he tossed stones at unwelcome visitors, "urinated" through cracks in walls, and—although he was partial to the family’s twelve-year-old daughter, Viorrey, and allegedly lived in her room, he sometimes mischievously locked her inside with a lock that, reportedly, could only be accessed from outside the room. Psychic investigators supposed Gef was a poltergeist or perhaps a ghost.

Not surprisingly, there were skeptics, including many fellow residents on the Isle of Man, who believed Viorrey was playing pranks. They accused her of using ventriloquism and other tricks, the effects of which were hyped by family members, reporters in search of a story, and credulous paranormalists. In fact, a reporter for the Isle of Man Examiner once caught Viorrey making a squeaking noise although her father had insisted the sound came from elsewhere in the room (Psychic Pets 1996, 72-83). In part the case recalls the celebrated magician/ventriloquist Signor Antonio Blitz who enjoyed strolling through a village and engaging in conversation with horses tied at hitching posts. Reportedly, he also "once discussed the state of the weather with a dead mackerel in a fish market and almost created a panic" (Christopher 1970, 49).

Psychic Pets

Trickery aside, what about reports of apparent animal ESP? Anecdotal evidence suggests some animals may have precognitive awareness of various types of natural catastrophes, becoming agitated before earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, cyclones, and other events. However, the creatures may actually be responding to subtle sensory factors—like variations in air pressure and tremors in the ground—that are beyond the range of human perception (Guiley 1991).

Something of the sort may explain some instances of apparent animal prescience. For example, a Kentucky friend of mine insists that his dogs seem to know when he has decided to go hunting, exhibiting a marked excitement even though they are lodged some distance away from the house. However, it seems possible that they are either responding to some unintended signal (such as recognizing certain noises associated with his getting ready for a hunting trip) or that he is selectively remembering those occasions when the dogs’ excitement happens to coincide with his intentions. Another friend says he once had dogs who seemed to know when he was going to take them for a walk, but he decided he must have unconsciously signaled them (such as by glancing in the direction of their hanging leashes).

There is also considerable anecdotal evidence of animals supposedly knowing when their masters were about to suffer harm or were being harmed (Guiley 1991). The operable word here is anecdotal: such tales are notoriously untrustworthy. For example, they may be subject to selective recall, so that after a death, say, the deceased’s dog is recalled to have "acted strangely" sometime before; other instances of the animals’ odd behavior, that did not coincide with the event, are conveniently forgotten. Additional problems with anecdotal evidence include the narrator’s ego and bias, memory distortion, and other factors.

Scientific tests of animal "psi" (a parapsychological term applied to ESP and psychokinesis) remain controversial (Ostrander and Schroeder 1971; Guiley 1991). Rigorous experimental protocols designed to exclude normal explanations (such as sensory cueing) tend not to show evidence for psi. An example is the report by Richard Wiseman et al., "Can animals detect when their owners are returning home? An experimental test of the 'psychic pet' phenomenon," published in the British Journal of Psychology.

The researchers responded to a suggestion by Rupert Sheldrake that just such a study be undertaken, and it followed a formal test of the alleged phenomenon by an Austrian television company. That test focused on an English woman and her dog and seemed successful. Wiseman et al. (1998) conducted four experiments designed to rule out the pet’s responding to routine or picking up sensory cues (either from the returning owner or from others aware of the expected time of return), as well as people’s selective memories and selective matching, and other possible normal explanations.

In all four experiments the dog failed to detect accurately when her owner set off for home, contradicting claims made on the basis of the previous (Austrian TV) study. The experiments suggested "that selective memory, multiple guesses and selective matching could often have sufficient scope to give an owner the impression of a paranormal effect."

Pet Psychics

People who are both devoted to their pets and credulous about the paranormal may easily fall prey to unsubstantiated claims of pet psychics. Some profess to treat animals’ emotional problems, for example, after supposedly communicating with them by ESP or other paranormal means, such as through astrology or assistance from the seer’s "spirit guides" (MacDougall 1983; Cooper and Noble 1996).

Having studied pet psychics at work—including Gerri Leigh (with whom I appeared on Springer) and Sonya Fitzpatrick (star of the Animal Planet channel’s The Pet Psychic)—I find that they impress audiences with some very simple ploys. Consciously or not, they are essentially using the same fortunetellers’ technique—"cold reading"—that is used for human subjects. This is an artful method of gleaning information from someone while giving the impression it is obtained mystically (Hyman 1977). After all, it is the pet owners, not the pets themselves, who "validate" the pronouncements. Here is a look at some of the common cold-reading techniques used by pet psychics.

1. Noting the obvious. Fitzpatrick (2002) visits an animal clinic with a couple and their infant daughter to tell them which dog is right for their family. After the selection is narrowed to three choices, each is brought out in turn. The first is ambivalent; the second ignores everyone; and the third, Patty, greets the couple and nuzzles the child. Sonya writes her choice on a slip of paper and it proves to be the same the couple made: Patty. The audience applauds: Patty was apparently their choice too! (I know she was mine!)
2. Making safe statements. Fitzpatrick (2002) announces that one pooch "says" he wants to go out more often, and the dog’s owners accept the assertion. Similarly, Gerri Leigh (1992) tells the owner of an outgoing little dog, who immediately licks Leigh’s hand, that the animal "fears no one"; but then she quickly adds that it is "not an unconditional lover." She continues by stating that the pet is "independent" and "not a yes dog." Such virtually universal declarations are not apt to be challenged.
3. Asking questions. Psychics frequently seem to provide information when they are in reality fishing for it. The asking of a question may, if it is correct, credit the reader with a hit; otherwise it will seem an innocent query. For instance, Fitzpatrick (2002) asks a dog owner, "When was there someone who was with him who went away?" (Unfortunately, this is too good a hit, since the young woman seems puzzled and replies that it could have been various persons—possibly, one imagines, former boyfriends or other acquaintances.) Questioning also keeps the reader from proceeding too far down a wrong path and allows for mid-course correction.
4. Offering vague statements that most people can apply specifically to themselves. Alleged psychics take advantage of what is known as "the Barnum effect"—after showman P. T. Barnum who strove to provide something for everyone (French et al. 1991). They learn that people will respond to a vague, generalized statement by trying to fit it to their own situation. Thus Fitzpatrick (2002) tells the owner of a pet iguana that the creature had experienced "a move." Now most people can associate a "move" with their pet: either when they acquired it, when they changed residences, or when they left it with someone to go on vacation, etc. Thus the pet psychic was credited with a hit (never mind that she incorrectly referred to the female iguana as "he").
5. Returning messages to animals. People who are convinced pets give information to psychics may be willing to believe the reverse. Thus Fitzpatrick (2002) claims to give animals "messages"—for example a clarification of something by the owner—by silently concentrating for a moment.

To find other lost animals, Carl claims she uses "visualization" to help them "find their way home." Thus, if an animal returns, Carl can claim credit; if not, she has a ready rationalization: some animals do not wish to come back and, says Carl, "I have to respect the animal’s wishes" (Cooper and Noble 1996).

Some pet psychics offer still other services. For example, Oklahoma "equine parapsychologist" Karen Hamel-Noble claims to heal horses. She uses her hands to detect "the source of weakness in their energy fields"—i.e., their imagined auras—then supplies compensating "energy" from herself (Cooper and Noble 1996). However, since auras remain scientifically unproved and tests of psychics’ abilities to see them have repeatedly failed (Nickell 2000), Hamel-Noble’s claims require proof, not just her feelings and assertions. Perhaps the animals’ perceived illnesses are merely responding to their natural healing mechanisms and the medical treatments Hamel-Noble provides them—including penicillin injections (Cooper and Noble 1996).

Pet Mediums

In the popular imagination, animals, like their human counterparts, may continue their existence after death, there being many reports of animal apparitions. And since pets are loved and often regarded as members of a family, it is not surprising that people occasionally experience "visitations" from their departed animal friends just as they do their human ones. However, these seem to have similar explanations to those of other apparitional experiences. For example, some who hear a dog’s phantom bark or footsteps, or see (as one reported) "a shadow jump up on the bed," do so just after rousing from sleep (Cohen 1984) and may thus be having "waking dreams." These are common hallucinations that occur in the twilight between being awake and asleep and exhibit content that "may be related to the dreamer’s current concerns" (Baker 1990). Similarly, apparitions that are seen during wakefulness tend to occur when one is tired, daydreaming (perhaps while performing routine work), or the like (Nickell 2001a, 291-292).

With the advent of spiritualism—the belief that the dead can be contacted—certain self-styled "mediums" began to offer themselves as intermediaries with the spirit realm. Some produced bogus spirit "materializations" and other physical phenomena, but these were frequently exposed as tricks by investigators like magician Harry Houdini. Today’s mediums tend to limit themselves to purely "mental phenomena," i.e., the use of "psychic ability" to obtain messages from "the other side."

Such mediums—like James Van Praagh, John Edward, Rosemary Altea, George Anderson, and Sylvia Browne—appear to rely largely on the old psychics’ standby, cold reading. In fact Edward (real name John MaGee Jr.) came to mediumship as an erstwhile fortuneteller at psychic fairs and now styles himself a "psychic medium." But on Dateline NBC he was caught cheating: attempting to pass off some previously gained knowledge as spirit revelation (Nickell 2001b).

Mediums like Edward and Van Praagh occasionally mention a pet—usually a dog—in a reading. Given the Barnum effect (discussed earlier), this usually gets a hit. For instance, on Larry King Live (February 26, 1999), Van Praagh told a caller: "I'm also picking up something on a dog. So I don't know why, but I'm picking up a dog around you." Note the vagueness of the reference—not even an indication of whether the animal is dead or alive or what link it might have to the person. But the caller offers the validation, "Oh, my dog died two years ago."

Some pet psychics, like Christa Carl, conduct "séance readings" for animals who have "passed over." Asked to give an example of such a séance, she replied (in Cooper and Noble 1996, 102):

Brandy, a dog, had been placed in a kennel by her owner when she got married. She broke away from the kennel and got killed.

Her owner called me and told me she was having a hard time and wanted to communicate with Brandy. When I did the reading with Brandy, I learned from her that she didn't know why she had been put in the kennel. She had felt abandoned, unloved, uncared for.

Her owner should have told her ahead of time why she needed to put her in a kennel. I explained it to Brandy, and now she’s at peace.

Of course, there is not the slightest bit of evidence that the spirit was contacted or that, in fact, it existed anywhere other than in the imagination of Christa Carl and, of course, the dog’s grieving, guilt-ridden, and credulous owner.

Such seems invariably the problem with claims involving psychic pets and pet psychics. Based on anecdotal evidence—wonderful tales of psychic and mediumistic success—they are not supported by scientific investigation.

References

• Baker, Robert A. 1990. They Call It Hypnosis. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 179-182.
• Christopher, Milbourne. 1962. Panorama of Magic. New York: Dover, 8-37.
• —. 1970. ESP, Seers & Psychics. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 39-54.
• Cohen, Daniel. 1984. The Encyclopedia of Ghosts. New York: Dorset Press, 137-149.
• Cooper, Paulette, and Paul Noble. 1996. 100 Top Psychics in America. New York: Pocket Books, 97-113.
• Fitzpatrick, Sonya. 2002. The Pet Psychic. Animal Planet channel, March 7.
• French, Christopher C., et al. 1991. Belief in astrology: a test of the Barnum effect. Skeptical Inquirer 15:2 (winter), 166-172.
• Guiley, Rosemary Ellen. 1991. Harper’s Encyclopedia of Mystical & Paranormal Experience. New York: HarperCollins, 22-25.
• Hyman, Ray. 1977. Cold reading: how to convince strangers that you know all about them. Skeptical Inquirer 1:2 (Spring/Summer), 18-37.
• Jay, Ricky. 1986. Learned Pigs & Fireproof Women. London: Robert Hale, 7-27.
• Leigh, Gerri. 1992. Appearance on The Jerry Springer Show, March 16.
• MacDougall, Curtis D. 1983. Superstition and the Press. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 532.
• Nickell, Joe. 1989. The Magic Detectives. Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 9-12.
• —. 2000. Aura photography: a candid shot. Skeptical Inquirer 24:3 (May/June), 15-17.
• —. 2001a. Real-life X-Files. Lexington, Ky.: University Press of Kentucky.
• —. 2001b. John Edward: Hustling the bereaved. Skeptical Inquirer 25:6 (November/December), 19-22.
• Ostrander, Sheila, and Lynn Schroeder. 1971. Psychic Discoveries Behind the Iron Curtain. New York: Bantam, 134-145.
• Psychic Pets and Spirit Animals: True Stories from the Files of Fate Magazine. 1996. New York: Gramercy Books.
• Sebeok, Thomas A. 1986. Clever Hans redivivus. Skeptical Inquirer 10:4 (summer), 314-318.
• Wiseman, Richard, Matthew Smith, and Julie Milton. 1998. Can animals detect when their owners are returning home? An experimental test of the 'psychic pet' phenomenon. British Journal of Psychology 89: 453-462.

One prominent feature of the Fourth World Skeptics Conference in Burbank, California, in June was the invited appearance of two prominent proponents of Intelligent Design (ID), William Dembski and Paul Nelson, to give talks and to defend their views in an open dispute with two opponents of the anti-evolution movement, Wesley Elsberry and Kenneth Miller.

This not-quite-common feature was despite the fact that the conference, organized by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (CSICOP), was designed as a meeting of skeptics, whose participants are squarely on the side of genuine science and are opponents of all disguised incarnations of creationism.

I cannot remember a single conference of creationists wherein the opponents of creationism were invited to give talks in open discussion.

The Skeptical Inquirer reported on this session in its subsequent Conference Report (September/October 2002, pp. 8-12), but here I comment more fully on and critique the presentation by Dembski.

The proponents of creationism sometimes accuse their detractors of being doctrinaire adherents of antireligious bias whose motivation is not pursuing the truth but assaulting religious faith. Although this may be not the most important point, still it seems worth mentioning that both Elsberry and Miller have asserted that they are not atheists. Professor of biology Miller is a faithful Catholic, and Elsberry, while vigorously defending the theory of evolution, has also said that he is a "theistic evolutionist."

Hence, both Dembski and Nelson were given a chance to argue in favor of their position using arguments of substance, based on facts rather than on ideology, in a dispute with opponents who had no reason to assault Dembski’s and Nelson’s religious beliefs. In this brief article I will discuss only the presentation by Dembski.

Complexity

The text of Dembski’s presentation (Dembski 2002a) is available on the Internet. This text is notable by the almost complete absence of arguments relevant to the gist of the dispute between ID advocates, like himself, and the opponents of that theory. Indeed, the only instance of Dembski’s touching on the substance of the dispute seems to be a paragraph where Dembski mentions his term specified complexity and unequivocally defines it as a synonym for "specified improbability." Of course, there is nothing new in that statement. Dembski has expressed his interpretation of complexity as "disguised improbability" in various forms in many of his articles and books (Dembski 1998 and 2002b). This interpretation has been criticized more than once as contrary to logic and to the accepted mathematical notion of complexity (Wein 2002, Perakh 2001 and 2002, and many others). Continuing in the same vein, Dembski repeats his often-stated thesis that what he calls "specified complexity" is a necessary indicator of design. The fallacy of that statement has been demonstrated more than once (for example, Edis 2001, Wilkins and Elsberry 2001, Perakh 2001 and 2002, Wein 2001 and 2002, Fitelson et al. 1999, Pennock 2000, Elsberry 2002, and others). Indeed, consider an example discussed several times before (Perakh 2001): Imagine a pile of pebbles found on a river shore. Usually each of them has an irregular shape, its color varying over its surface, and often its density also varying over its volume. There are no two pebbles which are identical in shape, color, and density distribution. I guess even Dembski would not argue that the irregular shape, color, and density distribution of a particular pebble resulted from intelligent design, regardless of how complex these shapes and distributions may happen to be. Each pebble formed by chance. Now, what if among the pebbles we find one that has a perfectly spherical shape, with an ideally uniform distribution of color and density? Not too many people would deny that this piece in all likelihood is a product of design. However, it is much simpler than any other pebble, if, of course, complexity is defined in a logically consistent manner rather than in Dembski’s idiosyncratic way. A logically consistent definition of complexity is given, for example, in the algorithmic theory of randomness-probability-complexity (and is often referred to as Kolmogorov complexity). The Kolmogorov complexity of a perfectly spherical piece of stone is much lower than it is for any other pebble having irregular shape and non-uniform distribution of density and color. Indeed, to describe the perfectly spherical piece one needs a very simple program (or algorithm), actually limited to just one number for the sphere’s diameter, one number for density, and a brief indication of color. For a piece of irregular shape, the program necessarily must be much longer, as it requires many numbers to reproduce the complex shape and the distributions of density and of color. This is a very simple example of the fallacy of Dembski’s thesis according to which design is indicated by "specified complexity." Actually, in this example (as well as in an endless number of other situations) it is simplicity which seems to point to design while complexity seems to indicate chance as the antecedent cause of the item’s characteristics.

Ad Populum Arguments

That is about all Dembski chose to discuss in his presentation with regard to the substance of the dispute. Instead, Dembski dabbles in prophecy. His argument in favor of ID mainly boils down to references to polls which show that the majority of Americans believe in some form of creationism. This may be true. However, Dembski himself gives an example of astrology, which is probably even more popular in America than is ID, but this by no means makes astrology plausible. Dembski is not arguing in his presentation that ID will win the minds because it is true. It will win, predicts Dembski, because the American public is predisposed to believe in ID. The same may be true, though, for astrology and other fads and fallacies he himself listed as being widespread despite their contradicting scientific data.

One more argument by Dembski is that young people are inclined to take the side of innovators, and, since ID-ists are the new guys in town, the sympathy of the younger generation will be with them, thus ensuring their victory. Once again, this may be true but it has nothing to do with the merits of ID "theory." If scientific theories were accepted or rejected by a popular vote, or just by the vote of young people, quantum mechanics, the general theory of relativity, and a whole bunch of other great achievements of the human mind would never have had a chance to take their legitimate place in the progress of humankind.

Later Dembski argues that his ID theory is "not a crank theory (at least not one that is obviously so)." The sole argument Dembski offers in favor of that statement is that Paul Davies "thinks that it’s onto something important," thus disagreeing with those who, like Wesley Elsberry, "think it merely codifies the argument from ignorance." This seems to be a rather weak argument, even by Dembski’s standards. The reference to Davies can be interpreted in various ways and is far from endorsing ID as a real scientific theory. Moreover, so what if Davies or any other writer has indeed said something that can somehow be interpreted charitably regarding Dembski’s ideas? A position whose strength can be sustained only by such ambiguous references is weak indeed and can be suspected of being crank science with a high degree of likelihood. If all Dembski can say in support of his views is that somebody thinks it has "something to it," it raises a suspicion that he has no factual evidence favoring his suppositions. To show that certain ideas or theories indeed belong in real science rather than crank science, one has to subject those ideas to merciless tests, wherein evidence supporting these ideas can be reproduced and independently verified. Dembski and his colleagues in the ID "movement" not only did not ever produce such evidence that could be independently verified, but in fact offered no evidence at all despite having substantial financial support and a significant fighting force at their Discovery Institute of Seattle. Instead of supporting his theory by factual evidence and arguments of substance, all Dembski was able to do was to resort to a dubious reference that proves nothing and is largely irrelevant. That is the tenor of Dembski’s entire presentation.

In a similar manner, Dembski plays with other quotations allegedly supporting his thesis, like a quotation from Mencken juxtaposed with a quotation from Gould, which, Dembski implies, contradict each other. The two quotations may or may not contradict each other (and actually they were relating to different situations and therefore their juxtaposition was meaningless). It is, however, always possible to mine a host of quotations on every subject and pretend that they prove something even if they are not relevant to each other in any way. Such play with mutually irrelevant quotations confirms the suspicion that Dembski has no real arguments that would be necessary in a talk to an audience not consisting of such ID adherents who would happily swallow anything seemingly confirming their already held preconceptions.

One of the main points stressed by Dembski in his presentation is the assertion that Intelligent Design, unlike such fringe pseudoscience as astrology and the like, has by now become firmly "mainstream." In this, Dembski depicts the desired as if it is real. So far, the overwhelming majority of mainstream scientists ignore ID, as can be seen by searching through the scientific literature. Practically no scientific magazine has published articles by scientists wherein a discussion of ID and related matters could be found. No references to ID can be found in the mainstream peer-reviewed scientific publications. The ID advocates either publish their productions as popular or semi-popular books and collections by nonscientific publishers or in their own periodicals mostly connected to their Discovery Institute. The only exception seems to be Dembski’s monograph (Dembski 1998) published by the Cambridge University Press. Even this book, reportedly, was Dembski’s doctoral dissertation in philosophy rather than in science. Regardless of how many times Dembski will repeat his mantra about "mainstreaming" ID, the scientific community has not and will not accept the claims by ID-ists unless and until he and his colleagues present real data supporting their contentions. So far no such data have been presented.

The overall level of Dembski’s acerbic assault on skeptics can be exemplified by his comment that the letters COP in the acronym CSICOP are "not accidental." Is this so? The absence of real arguments may be sometimes replaced with attempts at being witty by using irrelevant puns. Dembski wants readers to believe that the organization of skeptics is like police trying to muzzle its opponents. Somehow he does not notice the absurdity of such an accusation given the fact that he and Nelson are freely presenting their views at the meeting organized by the same CSICOP which allegedly is out to prevent the IDists from presenting their views.

Let me list some of the items that were discussed by Dembski’s critics (a partial list of critical reviews of Dembski’s literary production is given in my references section; this list does not include many more critical discussions of Dembski’s work). To some of his critics Dembski never replied in any form. To some others he responded, for example in his latest book (Dembski 2002), with superficial and largely irrelevant arguments (as discussed by Wein 2002 and Perakh 2002), but he never really replied to the substance of a number of points listed below, which constitute essential elements of his theory.

• Dembski asserted (Dembski 1998 and 2002) that complexity is tantamount to low probability. This assertion was rebuffed by more than one of the listed critics. Dembski never replied to that critique.
• Dembski asserted that his "explanatory filter" (Dembski 1998) never produces "false positives." This assertion was rebuffed by several of the listed (as well as by some not listed) critics. Dembski never replied to them. (It can be argued, though, that in his latest book Dembski [2002] by implication conceded that false positives can be produced by his "explanatory filter" after all; he still did not admit this explicitly.)
• Dembski announced a supposedly new important law—the so-called Law of Conservation of Information (Dembski 1998 and 2002). More than one critic argued that the law in question does not exist. Dembski never replied to those critics.
• Dembski widely used a concept of what he called "specified complexity" (Dembski 1998 and 2002). More than one critic argued that the concept in question is meaningless in the sense it has been used by Dembski. The latter never replied to this critique. The same can be said about Dembski’s concept of CSI—"Complex Specified Information" (Dembski 1998 and 2002).
• Dembski insists that design can be reliably inferred if low probability of an event is combined with its specification. More than one of the listed critics has argued that the specification as defined by Dembski has no reasonable interpretation. Dembski never responded to those critiques.

There are other claims by Dembski that have been subjected to critique to which Dembski has never responded while he continues to promote the same criticized concepts and assertions.

In his presentation, Dembski condescendingly suggested a program of action for skeptics if they wish to defend their position against ID. In his uncompromising self-confidence Dembski seems not to realize that if he suggests a new, allegedly revolutionary theory, the burden of proof is on him and on his colleagues in the ID camp. It is ID-ists who need to provide evidence, any evidence, in support of their position. It is precisely the absence of evidence for the ID theory that makes skeptics (read: mainstream scientists) reject ID. If Dembski or any of his colleagues showed any reasonable evidence supporting their views, then, beyond doubt, scientists would be much more receptive to their theory. So far this has not happened. Therefore, rather than suggesting what skeptics should do to defend their views from the assault by ID, Dembski should better think of how to search for any believable proof of his own so far arbitrary and dubious assertions.

By inviting Dembski and Nelson to give talks at the Fourth World Skeptics Conference, its organizers offered Dembski a chance to reply to his critics on the matters of substance and to defend his position in front of a diversified audience, mostly not very friendly to his views. By taking the floor at the conference in question, Dembski put himself in an unenviable position of denying a simple fact obvious to all—he was complaining about skeptics suppressing his views while speaking to the same skeptics who provided him the forum.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Brian Spitzer, Pete Dunkelberg, and Wesley Elsberry for constructive remarks regarding the initial version of this article.

References

• Elsberry, Wesley R. 2002. Review of W.A. Dembski’s The Design Inference, website, accessed on June 22, 2002.
• Dembski, William A. 2002a. Skepticism’s Prospects for Unseating Intelligent Design, website, accessed on June 22, 2002.
• —. 1998. The Design Inference, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
• —. 2002b. No Free Lunch—Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased without Intelligence, Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Edis, Taner. 2001. Darwin in Mind——Intelligent Design Meets Artificial Intelligence. website, accessed on January 17, 2002.
• Fitelson, Branden, Christopher Stephens, and Elliott Sober. 1999. How not to detect design—critical notice: William Dembski, The Design Inference. Philosophy of Science 66: 472-488.
• Pennock, Robert T. 2000. Tower of Babel. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.
• Perakh, Mark. 2001. A Consistent Inconsistency, website, accessed on June 22, 2002.
• —. 2002. A Free Lunch in a Mousetrap, website, accessed on June 22, 2002.
• Wein, Richard. 2000. What’s Wrong with the Design Inference, website, accessed on November 22, 2001.
• —. 2002. Not a Free Lunch But a Box of Chocolate, website, accessed on June 22, 2002.
• Wilkins, John S., and Wesley R. Elsberry. 2001. The advantages of theft over toil: The Design Inference and arguing from ignorance. Biology and Philosophy 16:711.

We live in days of all too obvious tension and occasional outright slaughter between specific Christian nations and certain Muslim ones. With this in mind, we can point to an instructive example of how a similar conflict that has occurred on a somewhat smaller geographical scale can be used to demonstrate that paranormal beliefs sometimes arise from a symbolic conflict between differing religious and ethnic groups. We can further demonstrate how such paranormal beliefs frequently both derive from and add to tensions associated with outright warfare and attempts at ethnic cleansings. To substantiate these claims I examine the case of the widely claimed apparitional appearances of the Virgin Mary in the former Yugoslavia.

Sources of Pseudoscientific Belief

The literature on paranormal belief is dominated by the view that such beliefs typically arise for highly idiosyncratic reasons, or at least from mistaken or bizarre thought processes. For example, Singer and Benassi (1981) have suggested that paranormal and pseudoscientific beliefs arise from common errors in human reasoning (such as those studied by learning psychologists examining errors of perception that seem to have their origins hardwired into the human brain). Singer and Benassi further identify sources of pseudoscientific belief as arising from poor or erroneous science education (see Eve and Dunn 1988; Gray 1987; etc.) or from erroneous or sensationalistic media coverage of science (Harrold and Eve 1987).

However, Singer and Benassi do, admittedly, suggest a fourth category: socio-cultural factors. It is this category that I wish to emphasize here. Pseudoscience arising out of socio-cultural forces is unique in that rather than representing bizarre or deviant thought processes, it is actually reflective of cognitive and heuristic conformity to the mode for one’s reference groups. It seems likely that most research into sources of paranormal beliefs have examined individuals or small groups (such as cults). I do not mean to suggest that there has not been a small proportion of studies that have examined the etiology of beliefs at a more "macro" level. For example, a number of studies have shown definitively that belief in creationism is significantly correlated with factors such as denominational affiliation, regionality within the U.S., gender, and other sociological factors. However, even these studies have for the most part been confined to examining major social trends within but a single country at a time.

Apparently individual experiences of the paranormal can, on at least some occasions, be shown to arise largely out of the broadest social forces, including even those that result in cross-national warfare. We are all children of our own times, and as such our conscious and rational mental processes tend to reflect the dominant cognitive and social paradigms of our times and our home nations. So too, even our apparently idiosyncratic hopes, fears, and subconscious compulsions tend to have their roots in the overall social fabric of everyday life. The phenomenon of the "Madonna of Medjugorje" is a good example.

This 1917 file photo shows the three Portuguese shepherd children Lucia Dos Santos (C) and her cousins Jacinta (L) and Francisco Marto. The Virgin Mary was said to have appeared to the children in 1917 and given them three messages — one about the end of WW I, one other about Russia, and a third “secret” that the Vatican never revealed. Francisco and Jacinta died in 1919 and 1920, and Lucia is a 93-year-old nun. Pope John Paul beatified Jacinta and Francisco in May 2000 during his visit to Fatima. Agence France Presse.

Medjugorje is a village located in the former Yugoslavia. It first came to my attention in 1985 while I was standing in a tube station in the Bloomsbury district of London looking at a huge paper advertisement on the wall. The advertisement asked the reader to "Dial Mary" and came complete with a toll-based long distance number. Callers could receive the benefit of daily communications as imparted by the Virgin Mary, who apparently channeled her invocations through several children in Medjugorje. Since 1981, the six young visionaries (Ivanka, Ivan, Jakov, Marija, Mirjana, and Vicka) had been experiencing nearly daily episodes of apparitions and communication with "Our Lady."

The overall result has been that since the 1980s, Medjugorje has attracted pilgrims from all over the world. It is not an exaggeration to state that tens of millions of the Catholic faithful and other seekers have made Medjugorje a Catholic shrine that exists nearly on an equal footing with the Vatican. The good news is that the Madonna’s messages as received through the children almost always encourage peace and love in the world. The bad news is that a number of much darker and less noble currents circulate just under the surface.

My purpose here is to examine some of these undercurrents, and try to draw some overall conclusions for a skeptical analysis of the origins of paranormal belief systems.

The Historical Context of Medjugorje

The events of recent decades in Medjugorje both follow and lead in a tradition of similar appearances of the Virgin. In Portugal in 1917 a series of apparitions by the Blessed Virgin occurred in the rural village of Fatima. Like the case of Medjugorje, the appearances were in a rural area and experienced by children, and the initial appearances were to become intensely politicized in the months that followed. An earlier and possibly less well-known instance of the phenomenon had occurred in Lourdes, France. In 1858, a thirteen-year-old girl named Bernadette Soubirous entered what is commonly described as a grotto in the nearby Massabielle rocks just outside of Lourdes. Bernadette at first felt that she saw "a white light" shining from a grotto, but upon closer inspection she said that she found the light to be presented to her in the form of the Virgin. Thereafter the appearances were to become known as the Miracle of Lourdes, the Apparition, and to be immortalized in the classic movie Song of Bernadette. The visions at Lourdes carried substantial political overtones. A good analysis of the political aspects of the apparitions has been presented by Harris (1999). Harris suggests that the true subtext of Lourdes is "a story about France, about the struggles of Catholics in the aftermath of revolutionary turmoil, the capacity of the Second Empire to adjust to, and even profit from, religious movements, and the inability of the Third Republic to suppress them." As at Medjugorje, the appearances of the Virgin were frequently accompanied by claims of miraculous healings (Boissarie 1933; West 1957).

As I mentioned, similar appearances of the Virgin took place in Fatima, Portugal, in 1917. Portugal was on the verge of totalitarianism after the revolution there in 1910. One result of the revolution had been the decree of a sharp separation of church and state. While the intelligentsia and political center ridiculed and suppressed religion, strong, but threatened, religious faith persisted in the peasants of the rural countryside. It is within this context that over a six-month period a series of apparitions by the Blessed Virgin occurred to three small children from the rural village of Fatima. The visions had begun in May of 1917, and throughout the early years of World War I the children were later to claim that they been repeatedly visited by a male "Angel of Peace." Matters were brought to a head in the fall of 1914 when Pope Benedict XV pleaded with the leaders of Europe to stop the bloodshed. The Pope went so far as to issue a policy statement that the invocation known as "Queen of Peace, pray for us" should be permanently included in the Church’s litany of prayer to Mary. It was in the context of having frequently heard this invocation upon the occasions of their church attendance that the children of Fatima had their first encounter with a vision of Mary. Mary thereafter appeared to the children on the thirteenth day of each month for six months. However, these apparitions had political implications: the mayor of Fatima, just before the scheduled August apparition, had the children arrested and tossed into jail, where they were interrogated and threatened with execution. One result of this precipitous action was described by numerous of the local believers as various solar abnormalities that occurred as an apparent sign of divine displeasure (Pelletier 1983). Just as at Lourdes earlier, and other locations such as Medjugorje later, the sun was said to "dance" in the sky, and also to vary alarmingly in its hues.

At one level the Fatima appearances obviously reinforced the threatened faith of the rural believers, helped along in no small part by the actions of the mayor whose tactics reified the old Marxist dictum that "external threat creates internal cohesion." One of the revelations of Mary at Fatima specifically denounced Russia and predicted worldwide disaster unless all people turned to the Catholic faith (Haffert 1950).

The Events in Medjugorje

Turning our attention back to the more recent phenomenon of Medjugorje, the visions there also took place in a specific historical context. The occupation of the nation by Nazi Germany in 1941 established a Croatian (i.e., largely Roman Catholic) fascist state that was strongly resisted by several groups. Especially suffering at the hands of the fascist regime were their Serbian (primarily Eastern Orthodox) neighbors. This oppression was in retaliation for 400 years of Turkish rule during which the Roman Catholics felt they had suffered a heavy hand upon them. In any event, hundreds had died in pogroms of the period.

Eventually the dissident group headed by Marshal Tito took full control after the German expulsion of 1945 and established a communist government. Even though Tito broke with Stalin and the Cominform in 1948 to develop his own brand of communism, Yugoslavia remained a communist regime, and religion was suppressed as a result. Religion, for example, had been entirely banned from the school classroom. In June of 1981 Ivanka Ivankovic, a fifteen-year-old schoolgirl, was the first to experience an apparition of the Virgin Mary. (I note that Ivanka’s mother had just died and Ivanka was to immediately refer to the Virgin as "Our Mother.") The apparition of the Virgin immediately gave Ivanka various messages of hope and peace to convey to the villagers (as she would almost daily do thereafter; why the Virgin chose not to speak directly with the villagers is unclear). The other two schoolgirls who were with her on the occasion of the first appearance later said that they too had seen the Virgin. Within days, hundreds of visitors began to arrive in the village to hear the messages and hopeful of seeing the apparition themselves.

The miracles in Medjugorje, while pleasing to the local Catholic peasants, set off dire concern among the party functionaries in the urban centers. Far from viewing the claimed appearances as fortuitous, the party leaders clearly feared that the apparitions might provide the focal point for a revitalization movement among the Catholics of the nation. The term revitalization movement is commonplace in modern anthropology. It refers to the largely spontaneous uprising of members of a formerly dominant (but then subordinated) group who attempt through militant action to recapture their former dominance, including the cultural and religious symbolism they favor. However, the uprising takes a singularly peculiar form. A revitalization movement typically begins in a manner that appears to be no more than a rebirth of interest in spiritual life among the oppressed. However, the apparently merely religious phenomenon in some cases provides an organizational structure for the discontented to quickly mobilize a political movement.

One example is the slave revolts in the Caribbean under colonialism. They initially appeared as an apparently apolitical revival of interest among the slaves in native African religions but were often followed by bloody slave uprisings. (So too, in some ways, can one conceptualize creationism within the U.S. as a revitalization movement—albeit a less bloody one. Creationism was the belief system of the dominant class a century ago in America. Little wonder that rural, older Protestants resent the politics and values of modern cosmopolitanism and multiculturalism. It is possible to see the creationism movement as less about the age of the Earth than as a revitalization movement intended to restore a formerly dominant worldview and lifestyle to its previous position of cultural and political dominance.)

In any event, the Communist government of the former Yugoslavia greatly feared that the alleged appearances of the Virgin Mary might be a thinly disguised device by which a Catholic Nationalist revitalization movement might attempt to reassert its claim to the nation.

On the eighth day of the children’s visions, the police attempted to break up the crowd and take the visionary children in custody. A Franciscan priest, upon seeing this, took the children to sanctuary in his local church. The priest later said that a divine voice had told him to protect the children. Some more cynical observers suggested it was the first step in the appropriation of the miracle by the organized Church. Apparently the Virgin was prepared to accommodate the new indoor arrangements, and thereafter began to appear to the children daily inside the church. Apparently, also, the Virgin was becoming increasingly interested in politics. The children were receiving ten messages each per day now, and many of these consisted of statements such as, "The Russians will become Christians" and "The West has lost its faith."

Vicka Ivankovic, who claims she has been meeting with the Virgin Mary every day for the past 21 years, and her groom Mario Mijatovic (L) are cheered by the crowds after their wedding in the Bosnian village of Medjugorje 26 January, 2002. AFP Photo Tom Dubravec.

Now the miracles came fast and frequent. Accounts of miraculous healings began to occur with frequency (for examples, see Nickell 1998). A cross on a nearby hill was said to sometimes turn into "a pillar of light," and as at Fatima, the sun was said to "dance" in the sky—although only some of those present on these occasions saw the transmutation of the cross or the dancing of the sun.

Things also began to take a somewhat ugly turn within the religious community. There had been for a hundred years a competitive relationship between the lay clergy and the Franciscan priests of the area. The lay clergy, also called diocesan priests, report directly to their bishop. They are trained in seminaries that are not associated with a particular order. Priests in the orders, e.g., Jesuits, Franciscans, Dominicans, Maryknoll, and so on, are always subject to the authority of the local bishop, but their main allegiance is to their order and its mission.

The lay clergy had for some time accused the Franciscan Brotherhood of being arrogant and manipulative. Now the lay clergymen began to accuse the Franciscans of having knowingly appropriated the appearances of the Virgin to legitimate their order at the expense of the influence of the lay clergy.

Conclusion

As I noted at the outset paranormal beliefs often can be generated by small group dynamics. Markovsky and Thye (2000), for example, have recently documented this dynamic in some convincing laboratory studies. However, it is clear that it is also possible for many paranormal beliefs to find their most primary initiation within the most macro-level of socio-cultural forces. I acknowledge that the children’s initial encounters with the Virgin may well have been caused by personal factors. For example, Ivanka, who was the first to perceive a visitation, had just lost her natural mother. The perception of apparitional experiences spread rapidly among her intimate peer group. Markovsky and Thye’s work may well help us to understand this spread of belief. The region’s tension and anxiety likely exacerbated this contagion process and the need to believe among the youthful protagonists. The seeds of hatred and ethnic-religious tensions must have been easy to feel. The breakup of the former Yugoslavia was imminent, and with that breakup Medjugorje would soon find itself located in Bosnia, with all that implies. Such tensions that would lead to the horrors of the 1990s in Bosnia must have been easy for children to intuit but not to understand. Little wonder that a nurturing maternal figure offering a message of peace and love would be of substantial comfort to the young people of the village. Ivanka herself said on film in the 1980s, "We have so much anxiety within ourselves—Our Lady has given us peace, especially the young people." She goes on to say that the appearances and pilgrimages (which brought great prosperity to the formerly poverty-stricken village) have ". . . given a sense of pride to a people whose lives have been mostly struggle."

On another level it is quite likely that the initial experiences of the young visionaries are partly due to the personal situation of the young teens. In all the European cases of appearances of the Virgin cited here, those who are the central initial witnesses are children or young teenagers; recall that in many historical witch trials the original witnesses were of the same young age. Some observers have suggested that in the case of the witch trials the experience of being so important a witness must have been very satisfying to young members of society who ordinarily lack any real power or influence over the lives of the adults around them.

Very quickly the personal experiences of the young people were appropriated by adults and authorities for their own purposes and their own needs. Clearly many Croatians felt it good to promote the legitimacy of the miracles in Medjugorje for purposes intended to put the Serbs and Muslims of the region at a disadvantage, as well as offering a potential rallying point for opposition to a secular central government. There is in one sense a most tragic irony in our observations. Most witnesses felt, and even now continue to feel, that the Virgin’s appearances heralded an improved chance for peace and human kindness in the world. However, from another perspective it is possible to see claims associated with the appearances as symbolic weapons of mass destruction. In other words, the appearances may also have had the effect of both consciously and subconsciously heightening tensions in the region, tensions that would eventually lead to deaths of thousands. If this is indeed even in part what actually happened in the region we can only wonder at the terrible irony and grieve at the terrible results.

On a final note, a major implication of our case study here of a small town in the Balkans is that in some ways the political and ethnic tensions seen there in the 1980s may have moved beyond the Balkans. The phenomena of Medjugorje was fed to a large degree by tensions between Christians and Muslims. It is all too obvious that since September 11, 2001, we might now expect a rash of other pseudoscience beliefs that can be used as symbolic weapons—weapons of belief that have their roots partially or entirely in tensions that arise out of the conflict between the world’s two most enthusiastically proselytizing religions. It’s not just jetliners and anthrax powder that are capable of wreaking havoc; we have seen here that paranormal beliefs can sometimes carry a serious payload of their own.

Note

I'd like to mention a personal experience of my own arising out of the study of Medjugorje. I was asked by a large newspaper a few years ago for my opinion of why millions were traveling to Medjugorje. I spent nearly an hour on the phone with the reporter explaining the political and historical contexts that undoubtedly played a huge role in the popularity and meaningfulness assigned by various groups and individuals to the apparitions. When the article appeared in print there was not a single word about the ethnic-nationalistic implications of the appearances, nor was their any mention of how the event symbolized internecine struggles within the Catholic hierarchy itself. When I phoned the reporter and asked why all this had been omitted, I was told because it was too abstract and therefore would have gotten in the way of a good "story." The lessons to be learned in how the press covers paranormal claims are obvious.

References and Readings of Interest

• Alonso, Joaquin Maria. 1979. The Secret of Fatima Fact and Legend. Cambridge, Mass.: Ravengate Press.
• Boissarie, Prosper Gustave. 1933. Healing at Lourdes. Baltimore, Md.: The John Murphy Company.
• Carter, Edward. 1994. The Spirituality of Fatima and Medjugorje. Milford, Ohio: Faith Publishers.
• Cranston, Ruth. Bureau médical (Lourdes, France). 1988. The Miracle of Lourdes. New York: Image Books.
• Eve, Raymond A., and Dana Dunn. 1988. "Psychic powers, astrology, and creationism in the classroom? Evidence of pseudoscientific beliefs among U.S. secondary school biology and life science teachers." Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association.
• Fulda, Edeltraud. 1961. And I Shall Be Healed: The Autobiography of a Woman Miraculously Cured at Lourdes. N.Y.: Simon and Schuster.
• Gray, Thomas. 1987. Educational experience and belief in the paranormal. In Cult Archaeology and Creationism, edited by F. Harrold and R. Eve. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
• Haffert, John M. 1950. Russia Will Be Converted. Washington, N.J.: AMI International Press.
• Harris, Ruth. 1999. Lourdes Body and Spirit in the Secular Age. N.Y.: Viking.
• Harrold, Francis B., and Raymond A. Eve. 1987. Patterns of creationist belief among college students. In Cult Archaeology and Creationism: Understanding Pseudoscientific Beliefs About the Past, edited by F. Harrold and R. Eve. Iowa City: University of Iowa Press.
• Lasserre, Henri. 1980. Les Apparitions de la Très-Sainte Vierge Marie À la Grotte de Lourdes et le Jaillissement de la Source Miraculeuse. Trois-Rivières [Québec]: P.V. Ayotte.
• Markovsky, Barry, and Shane Thye. 2001. Social influences on paranormal beliefs. Sociological Perspectives 44(1): 21-44.
• Marnham, Patrick. 1980. Lourdes: A Modern Pilgrimage. London: Heinemann.
• Nickell, Joe. 1998. Looking for a Miracle: Weeping Icons, Relics, Stigmata, Visions, and Healing Cures. Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books.
• Pelletier, Joseph Albert. 1983. The Sun Danced at Fatima. Garden City, N.Y.: Image Books.
• Singer, Barry, and Victor A. Benassi. 1981. Occult beliefs. American Scientist 69: 49-55.
• West, D.J. 1957. Eleven Lourdes Miracles. London: Duckworth.