The story actually began earlier when the pastor of Ascension of Our Lord Church attempted to dispose of a discarded communion wafer by dissolving it in holy water as mandated by church policy. Instead, in a few days it had become stringy and fleshlike, seeming to many parishioners to confirm the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. This holds that the consecrated wafer and wine of holy communion are not merely symbolic, as most Protestants believe, but actually become the body and blood of Christ.

Archdiocesan authorities responded with caution, predicting “a scientific, naturalistic explanation” for the phenomenon and commissioning a medical school professor of biochemistry to test samples of the substance.

After a week of analysis the scientists reported that “no human cellular morphology or structure was seen,” only “mold or fungus.” At least one church member was undaunted. She told reporters, “to me it was a miracle.”

The Boeing 747 aircraft exploded mysteriously off the coast of Long Island in 1996, engendering many conspiracy theories.

The psychic, who was not named, attributed the explosion to a bomb near the left wing. That claim corroborated the FBI’s initial conviction that the plane was downed in an act of terrorism, despite contrary evidence provided by the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, the National Transportation Safety Bureau, and the CIA.

In the end, the psychic was wrong: an exhaustive investigation showed that the cause was likely a center fuel tank malfunction. The psychic’s proclamation may have been used to justify prolonging the FBI’s $20 million investigation, thereby wasting taxpayer’s money. But perhaps more dangerously, airline passenger safety was compromised when corrective fuel tank recommendations were put on hold pending the outcome of the FBI’s investigation.

"Lord Narayana” - actually Austrian-born Alfred Schmielewski - gave readings at psychic fairs where he claimed to be, among other superlatives, “the world’s foremost authority in the field of world prophecy.” Although he was one of millions who correctly predicted (in 1980) that Ronald Reagan would win the U.S. presidency, he had numerous “misses.” For example, the planet’s “greatest natural disaster” did not hit Montréal in 1988; neither was Mikhail Gorbachev assassinated in the Kremlin in 1987.

Although the 71-year-old seer also styled himself “the businessman’s psychic,” his 1980 and 1994 visions of imminent economic crisis were failed prophecies, and at the time of his death he remained a man of modest means.

Lord Narayana was killed on April 11, 1999, when he answered a knock at the door of his Mississauga, Ontario, home and was shot in the head at point-blank range by an unknown assailant. Police were speculating - but not predicting - that his killer would prove to be a disgruntled client. They said genuine psychic information was welcome.

According to news sources, fifty people had witnessed poltergeist-like phenomena, including toppled statues and candles flying across the nave. The church was soon closed, while an exorcist was called in to drive out the sinister force.

Then came a follow-up from the Associated Press. The November 1 report explained that the village mayor, Thierry Marceaux, 32, had been detained by police after admitting he was responsible for the apparently paranormal events. He had produced all of the effects, lurking in shadows and tossing the objects, then appearing moments later to feign horror.

Local authorities, threatening to charge Marceaux for wasting police time, freed him on condition he see a psychiatrist. He apologized for his mischief - supposedly intended to amuse - through his attorney.

The victim believed Tene’s tarot readings to be accurate and agreed to subsequent regular meetings with Tene. During the meetings, Tene befriended the victim and learned that she had received a substantial inheritance.

In November 1996, Tene told the victim that her inheritance was the cause of her personal and professional unhappiness. Tene convinced her client that she could cleanse the money of evil spirits and, thereafter, Tene would return the money and the victim’s life would get back on the right path.

Tene instructed the victim to make cash withdrawals, which would later be used during “cleansing ceremonies” so that Tene could “rid it of evil.” After receiving nearly $160,000 in cash and items valued at more than $40,000, Tene left Boston for New York, never returning to see the victim again.

Tene was finally arrested by the FBI in March 1998. In addition to the prison time, U.S. District Court Judge Nancy Gertner ordered restitution of $202,817 and ordered that Tene serve three years of supervised release upon completion of her sentence.

In another case in New York City, two women were arrested for pulling a similar scam in the borough of Queens. Sonya Cruz (also known as Signorita Rita), 34, and Estee Lee, 43, were arrested in late January 1999 and charged with scheme to defraud, grand larceny, and fortunetelling. Cruz reportedly hosted a fortune-telling radio show and placed ads in newspapers to attract customers. The women charged customers more than $1,000 to take away supposed curses or heal problems, such as a husband’s drinking.

Dr. Rosenfeld, a cardiologist and professor of medicine, has appeared on national TV talk/interview shows since the 1960s. He has written several books, including the 1996 best-selling Dr. Rosenfeld’s Guide to Alternative Medicine. Upon locating the book, I found a discussion of the operation in question on pages 30-32. My quotations herein are from the Parade article, the book, and several e-mail communications to me from Rosenfeld.

Accompanied on his China trip by several other prominent American physicians (now deceased), the Rosenfeld party watched as a 28-year-old female patient was wheeled into an operating room at the University of Shanghai and prepped for heart surgery to repair her mitral valve. But in lieu of standard anesthesia, a practitioner placed “an acupuncture needle in her right earlobe” (per Parade), with an electrode attached to supply a mild electrical current.

Rosenfeld observed as “the surgeon . . . cut through the . . . breastbone with an electric buzzsaw [and] her chest was split in two [and] spread apart with a large clamp to expose the heart” (per his book). Rosenfeld shortly thereafter snapped the photograph that appears in Parade (it was not used in the book). Because Rosenfeld has denied me permission to reprint his photograph, artist Don Addis has faithfully reproduced its image (figure 1), which is rotated 90 degrees counterclockwise. (Addis, editorial cartoonist for the St. Petersburg Times, is also the cartoonist for the Tampa Bay Skeptics Report.)

Only the patient’s face and incision are visible through the gaps in the surgical sheets. Assume, as the photo appears to indicate, that her head is essentially “face up” as opposed to being significantly rotated right or left. (Her eyes are focused to her left, as if she is attempting to observe the operation but cannot rotate her head.) Drawing a vertical line down the midline of her body, the operative field appears to be displaced far to the patient’s left, rather than being centered where the breastbone and heart are situated. In fact, it appears so far to the left as to exist beyond the border of the patient’s body (see figure 2). There does not appear to be any appreciable distortion in the photo such as might be encountered from the use of a wide-angle lens.

Rosenfeld says that this apparent leftward displacement “must be due to the angle at which [the photo] was taken” (per e-mail to me). He informed me that one of the others present (Dr. Wilbur Gould, ENT) had also taken photos and that his widow “. . . no doubt has all his . . . pictures in her possession.” But he would not assist me in contacting her to obtain the photographs for review, saying that he did not wish to “participate in your project to prove that my four colleagues and I did not see what we saw.”

In addition to the photographic oddities, I asked Rosenfeld how such surgery could have been performed without artificial ventilation: With the chest split open as described, the negative pressure produced by chest-wall expansion could not be created, the lungs would collapse, and the patient would asphyxiate. I pointed out other problems as well, which are explored in a more extensive article on this matter that I have written with Dr. Wallace Sampson, tentatively planned for publication in the Fall/Winter 1999 issue of The Scientific Review of Alternative Medicine (SRAM).

I suggested to Dr. Rosenfeld that his party may have been taken in by a hoax perpetrated for propaganda purposes - a well-documented tactic used by the Chinese during the Cold War. But Rosenfeld scoffed at the notion (as he does in his book) and suggested that I contact Dr. Michael DeBakey, one of the world’s foremost cardiac surgeons, who “witnessed a similar procedure one year later [and] can explain your legitimate technical questions about ventilatory support. I spoke with him yesterday . . .” (per Rosenfeld’s e-mail).

I asked Sampson to speak with DeBakey on our behalf, and the results of that interview were quite enlightening.

DeBakey informed Sampson that despite his conversation with Rosenfeld just a few days earlier, he had neither read Rosenfeld’s accounts of the operation nor seen his photograph, and he was thus unconversant with the details in question. As for his own experience in China, DeBakey recalled that the mitral valve surgery that he had witnessed involved a patient who, it turned out, had received not only acupuncture, but also intravenous medication before and during the operation. Additionally, DeBakey told Sampson that artificial ventilation had not been needed in the operation that he saw because it had been performed through an incision between two right ribs, thus sparing one (the left) lung. He added that, in his opinion, a midline, split-breastbone approach, such as described by Rosenfeld, would likely cause both lungs to collapse, just as we had suspected.

Before I knew of Sampson’s own interest in this case, and at about the time I was initiating my correspondence with Rosenfeld, Sampson had written to Parade editor Larry Smith (Rosenfeld is the magazine’s health editor), pointing out some of the incongruities I've noted here. He asked how he might assist Parade in rectifying “the incorrect impressions given by the article.” Sampson, a professor of medicine at Stanford University and editor in chief of SRAM, did not receive a reply.

A few additional observations about the precision of Rosenfeld’s recollections and his attention to detail in recounting them: He acknowledged to me that, not being a surgeon, he actually “did not pay any particular attention at the time to the surgical technique used.” He says in his book (contrary to the Parade version) that “needles” (plural) had been placed in the patient’s “left” (not “right”) earlobe. He explained to me that this “was a typo, which was not picked up since I did not use the photo” in the book. But the image was presumably indelibly imprinted in his mind. From the book: “I took a color photograph of that memorable scene: the open chest, the smiling patient, and the surgeon’s hands holding her heart. I show it to anyone who scoffs at acupuncture.” Yet, the photo clearly shows the surgeon’s hands to the lower-left of the patient’s heart - hardly another “typo.”

Toward the end of our correspondence, Rosenfeld told me that, in publicizing the China story, his motivation had simply been “to draw attention to the possible use of acupuncture to alleviate chronic pain and suffering. . . . I thought acupuncture was worth looking into. I still do, as does a panel convened recently by the NIH. . . . I continue to keep an open mind on the subject.” While I expressed my appreciation of that position, I also conveyed my concern that many of Parade's 80-plus-million readers could easily have drawn a conclusion that Rosenfeld says he did not intend - that acupuncture appears to possess mysterious and unexplained, perhaps even supernatural, anesthetic properties.

To this point about the important role that authorities such as Rosenfeld play in educating the American public on health-related issues, he replied, “As far as your fear that my readers will opt for acupuncture anesthesia during heart surgery, I think I can reassure you not to worry about it.” Oh. Well, never mind, then.

Scientific Inquiry

The relationship between science and religion has engendered heated controversy. This debate has its roots in the historic conflict between the advocates of reason and the disciples of faith. On the current scene, there is a vocal hallelujah chorus singing praises to the mutual harmony and support of these two realms or “magisteria.” I have serious misgivings about this alleged rapprochement, but I wish to focus on only one aspect of the controversy, and ask: To what extent should we apply skepticism to religious claims?

By the term “skepticism” I do not refer to the classical philosophical position which denies that reliable knowledge is possible. Rather, I use the term "skepticism” to refer to skeptical inquiry. There is a contrast between two forms of skepticism, (1) that which emphasizes doubt and the impossibility of knowledge, and (2) that which focuses on inquiry and the genuine possibility of knowledge; for this latter form of skepticism ("the new skepticism,” as I have labeled it),1 skeptical inquiry is essential in all fields of scientific research. What I have in mind is the fact that scientific inquirers formulate hypotheses to account for data and solve problems; their findings are tentative; they are accepted because they draw upon a range of confirming evidence and predictions and/or fit into a logically coherent theoretical framework. Reliable hypotheses are adopted because they are corroborated by a community of inquirers and because the tests that confirm them can be replicated. Scientific hypotheses and theories are fallible; and in principle they are open to question in the light of future discoveries and/or the introduction of more comprehensive theories. The point is that we have been able to achieve reliable knowledge in discipline after discipline because of the effective application of skeptical inquiry.

Now the central questions that have been raised concern the range of skeptical inquiry. Are there areas such as religion in which science cannot enter? In particular, Should the skeptical movement extend its inquiry to religious questions? Some influential skeptics think we should not. In my view, skeptical inquirers definitely need to investigate religious claims. I do not think that CSICOP and the Skeptical Inquirer, however, should deal with religious claims; or if they do so, it should be only in a limited way. I shall deal with my reasons for these perhaps surprising statements later in this article.

Science has always had its critics, who have insisted that one or another area of human interest is immune to scientific inquiry. At one time it was proclaimed that astronomers could never know the outermost reaches of the universe (August Comte), the innermost nature of the atom (John Locke), or human consciousness (Henri Bergson). Critics have also insisted that we could not apply science to one or another aspect of human experience-political, economic, social, or ethical behavior, the arts, human psychology, sexuality, or feeling. I do not think that we should set a priori limits antecedent to inquiry; we should not seek to denigrate the ability of scientific investigators to explain behavior or to extend the frontiers of research into new areas.

Can There Be a Science of Religion?

Some have argued that religious phenomena-matters of faith-are entirely beyond the ken of science; but this surely is false because the scientific investigation of religion has already made great strides and there is a vast literature now available. We may talk about religion in at least two senses: First, religion refers to a form of human behavior that can be investigated. Second, it is used to refer to the transcendental, i.e., to that which transcends human experience or reason.

Let us turn to the first area. Religious behavior has been investigated by a wide range of disciplines: Anthropologists deal with the comparative study of primitive religions, examining prayer, ritual, the rites of passage, etc. Sociologists have investigated the institutional aspects of religious behavior, such as the role of the priestly class in society. Ever since William James, psychologists of religion have studied the varieties of religious experience, such as mysticism, ecstasy, talking in tongues, exorcism, etc. Similarly, biologists have postulated a role for religious beliefs and practices in the evolutionary process and their possible adaptive/survival value. They have asked, Does religiosity have a genetic or environmental basis? Others have focused on the neurological correlates of religious piety, and still others have attempted to test the efficacy of prayer.

One can deal with religion in contemporary or historical contexts. A great deal of attention has been devoted to the historical analysis of religious claims, especially since the great classical religions are based on ancient documents (the Old and New Testaments and the Koran), as are some of the newer religions (such as the nineteenth-century Book of Mormon). These texts allege that certain miraculous and revelatory events have occurred in the past and these warrant religious belief today; and it is often claimed that belief in them is based upon faith.

I would respond that scientific methodology has been used in historical investigations to examine these alleged events. Archaeologists seek independent corroborating evidence; they examine written or oral accounts that were contemporaneous with the events (for example, by comparing the Dead Sea Scrolls with the New Testament). The fields of “biblical criticism” or “koranic criticism” have attempted to use the best scholarly techniques, historical evidence, and textual and linguistic analysis to ascertain the historical accuracy of these claims.

Paranormal claims are similar to religious claims-both purport to be exceptions to natural laws. Skeptics have asked: Did D.D. Home float out of a window and levitate over a street in London in the late nineteenth century? Did the Fox sisters and Eusapia Palladino possess the ability to communicate with the dead? And they have sought to provide naturalistic interpretations for reports of bizarre events. No doubt it is easier to examine contemporaneous claims where the record is still available rather than ancient ones where the record may be fragmentary. Yet in principle at least, the religious investigator is similar to the paranormal investigator, attempting to ascertain the accuracy of the historical record. We use similar methods of inquiry to examine prosaic historical questions, such as: Did Washington cross the Delaware, or Thomas Jefferson sire the children of Sally Heming? The same goes for religious claims: Did the Red Sea part before the fleeing Hebrews, was there a Great Flood and a Noah’s Ark? I don't see how or why we should declare that these historical religious claims are immune to scientific investigation.

Thus I maintain that insofar as religion refers to a form of human behavior, whether in the past or the present, we can, if we can uncover corroborating data or historical records, attempt to authenticate the historical claims and ask whether there were paranormal, occult, or transcendental causes, or whether naturalistic explanations are available. David Hume’s arguments against miracles indicate all the reasons why we should be skeptical of ancient claims-because they lack adequate documentation, because the eyewitnesses were biased, and so on. And this should apply, in my view, to reports of revelation as well as miracles. Extraordinary claims that violate naturalistic causal regularities should require strong evidence. I don't see how anyone can protest that his beliefs ought to be immune to the standards of objective historical investigation, simply by claiming that they are held on the basis of faith. A good case in point is the alleged burial shroud of Jesus, the Shroud of Turin. Meticulous carbon-14 dating by three renowned laboratories has shown that the cloth is approximately 700 years old and therefore most likely a forgery. The fact that believers may seek to shield their belief by proclaiming that they have faith that the Shroud is genuine does not make it any more true. The same principle applies to the key miraculous revelations of the past upon which the classical religions are allegedly based. The strength of a hypothesis or belief should be a function of the empirical evidence extant brought to support it, and if the evidence is weak or spotty, then the faith claim should likewise be so regarded.

Religious belief systems are deeply ingrained in human history, culture, and social institutions that predate science, and thus it is often difficult, if not impossible, to insist upon using the standards of objective skeptical inquiry retrospectively. This is especially the case since to believe in a religion is more than a question of cognitive assent, for religion has its roots in ethnic or national identity; and to question the empirical or rational grounds for religious belief is to shake at the very foundations of the social order.

How to Deal with the Transcendental?

There is a second sense of religion that is nonbehavioral. Here the key question concerns the very existence of a “transcendental, supernatural, occult, or paranormal realm” over and beyond the natural world. The scientific naturalist argues that we should seek natural causes and explanations for paranormal and religious phenomena, that we should never abandon scientific methodology, and that we should endeavor totest all claims by reference to justifying evidence and reasons.

We may ask, What is the truth value of theistic claims? In the great debate between scientific or philosophical skeptics and theists, agnostics/nontheists/atheists maintain that theists have not adequately justified their case and that their claims are unlikely or implausible. I will not here review the extensive classical argument or the kinds or evidence adduced.

I do wish, however, to focus on one point that has recently emerged in the literature. And this concerns a prior question raised by analytic philosophers about the meaning of “God language.” Any scientific inquiry presupposes some clarity about the meaning of its basic terms. Is religious language to be taken literally, descriptively, or cognitively; and if so, are we prepared to assert that there is some “transcendental ground, cause, creator, or purpose” to the universe? Most linguistic skeptics have sought to deconstruct religious language and have had difficulty in determining precisely to what the terms "God” or “divinity” or “transcendental being” refer. Similarly for the vague, often incoherent, use of the term “spirituality,” so popular today. They appear to be indefinable, even to theologians, and hence before we can say whether He, She, or It exists, we need to know precisely what is being asserted. Most God talk is nonfalsifiable, in that we would not know how to confirm or disconfirm any claim about His presence or existence. God talk is by definition difficult or impossible insofar as it transcends any possible experience or reason and lurks in a mysterious noumenal realm. There are surely many things that we do not know about the universe; but to describe the unknown as “divine” is to take a leap of faith beyond reasonable evidence.

Linguistic skeptics have held that if we are to make sense of religious language, we must recognize that it has other nondescriptive or noncognitive functions. It does not convey us truth about the world (thus competing with science or ordinary experience), but is evocative, expressive, or emotive in character, or is performatory and celebrative in a social context, or is moral in its imperative function, or it has poetic metaphorical meaning. Thus God talk should be construed primarily as a form of personal and social moral poetry. If this is the case, then religion does not give us knowledge or truth; instead it expresses mood and attitude.

I am not talking about the historical truth of Jesus’ alleged resurrection or Joseph Smith’s encounter with the angel Moroni or Mohammed’s communication with Gabriel-these are concrete historical claims and in principle at least are available to empirical and rational inquiry and have some experiential content (even though the evidence may be fragmentary or incomplete), but of “divinity” viewed outside of history as a transcendental being or spiritual reality. It is the latter that is incomprehensible almost by definition.

Thus religion should not compete with science about the description and explanation of natural processes in the universe. Science deals most effectively with these questions, not religion. To claim to believe in the theory of evolution, and yet insist the “human soul” is an exception to evolutionary principles because it is created by a deity, is an illegitimate intrusion of an occult cause. Similarly, to seek to transcend the “big bang” physical theory in science by postulating a creator is to leap beyond the verifiable evidence. To say that this is justified by faith is, in my judgment, unwarranted-the most sensible posture to adopt here is that of the agnostic.

In the last analysis, religion and science are different forms of human behavior and have different functions. We may analogically ask, What is the relationship between science and sports, or science and music? These are different forms of experience, and they play different roles in human behavior. Surely neither sports nor music compete in the range of truth claims. In this sense, religion should not be taken as true or false, but as evocative, expressive, uplifting, performatory, good or bad, beautiful or ugly, socially unifying or disruptive. Historically, the claims of religion were taken as true, but this was a prescientific posture drawing upon myth and metaphor, metaphysics and speculation, not testable claims. Thus “religious truth” cannot be appealed to in order to contest the verified findings of the sciences.

I should add that I do not believe that ethics need be based on religious faith either. To maintain that the proper or exclusive role of religion is within the realm of morality (or meaning) is, I think, likewise questionable, particularly when we examine the concrete ethical recommendations made about sexual morality, divorce, abortion, euthanasia, the role of women, capital punishment, etc. This is all the more so, given the fact that religions often disagree violently about any number of moral principles. I believe that there are alternative humanistic and rational grounds for ethical judgment, based in part on scientific knowledge, but that is a topic for another paper.

Skeptical Inquiry and Religion

The key question that I wish to address is, Should skeptical inquirers question the regnant sacred cows of religion? There are both theoretical and prudential issues here at stake. I can find no theoretical reason why not, but there may be practical considerations. For one, it requires an extraordinary amount of courage today as in the past (especially in America!) to critique religion. One can challenge paranormal hucksters, mediums, psychics, alternative therapists, astrologers, and past-life hypnotherapists with abandon, but to question the revered figures of orthodox religion is another matter, for this may still raise the serious public charge of blasphemy and heresy; and this can be dangerous to one’s person and career-as Salman Rushdie’s fatwah so graphically demonstrates.

History vividly illustrates the hesitancy of skeptics to apply their skepticism to religious questions. In ancient Rome, Sextus Empiricus, author of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, defended the suspension of belief in regard to metaphysical, philosophical, and ethical issues. He did not think that reliable knowledge about reality or ethical judgments was possible. He neither affirmed nor denied the existence of the Gods, but adopted a neutral stance. Since there was no reliable knowledge, Pyrrho urged that compliance with the customs and religion of his day was the most prudent course to follow. The great skeptic Hume bade his friend, Adam Smith, to publish his iconoclastic Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion after his death (in 1776), but Smith declined to do so, disappointing Hume. Hume’s nephew David arranged for posthumous publication. The French author Pierre Bayle (1647-1706), perhaps expressed the most thoroughgoing skepticism of his time. In his Dictionnaire historique et critique, Bayle presented a scathing indictment of the prevailing theories of his day, finding them full of contradictions. He was highly critical of religious absurdities. He maintained that atheists could be more moral than Christians, and that religion did not necessarily provide a basis for ethical conduct. Nonetheless, Bayle professed that he was a Christian and a Calvinist, and this was based upon pure faith, without any evidence to support it-this is known as fideism. Did Bayle genuinely hold these views, or was his fideism a ruse to protect his reputation and his fortune?

This form of fideism, I maintain, on theoretical grounds is illegitimate, even irrational. For if, as skeptical inquirers, we are justified in accepting only those beliefs that are based upon evidence and reason, and if there is no evidence either way or insufficient evidence, should we not suspend judgment, or are we justified in taking a leap of faith? If the latter posture of faith is chosen, one can ask, On what basis? If a person is entitled to choose to believe whatever he or she wishes, solely or largely because of personal feeling and taste, then “anything goes.” But this anarchic epistemological principle can be used to distort honest inquiry. (The implication of this argument is that if we do not have a similar feeling, we are entitled not to believe.) One may ask, Can one generalize the epistemological rule, and if so, can it apply to paranormal claims? Is someone thus entitled to believe in UFO abductions, angels, or demons on the basis of feeling and fancy? The paranormal skeptic retort is that where there is evidence to decide the question, we are not justified in believing; though in a democracy we are not entitled to expect others to share our skepticism.

But as a matter of fact, most of those who believe in the traditional religions do not base it on pure fideism alone, but on reasons and evidence. Indeed, no less an authority than Pope John Paul II maintained the same in a recent encyclical entitled “Faith and Reason.” In this, the Pope condemns both fideism and atheism. He attacks the naive faith in “UFOs, astrology, and the New Age.” He criticizes “exaggerated rationalism” and pragmatism on the one hand and postmodernism on the other, but he also condemns the exclusive reliance on faith. The Pope maintains that reason and scientific inquiry support rather than hinder faith in Christian revelation and Catholic doctrine. Skeptics might agree with the Pope’s defense of reason and scientific inquiry, but question whether these do indeed support his own beliefs.

Thus, in my judgment, acquiescence by skeptics to the fideist’s rationalization for his beliefs is profoundly mistaken. Similarly, in answer to those theists who maintain that there is adequate evidence and reasons for their belief, skeptical inquirers should not simply ignore their claims, saying that they are beyond scientific confirmation, but should examine them. Since the burden of proof is always upon the claimant, skeptical inquirers may question both the fideist and the partial-evidentialist in religion, if they do not believe that they have provided an adequate justified case.

Conclusion

The upshot of this controversy, in my judgment, is that scientific and skeptical inquirers should deal with religious claims. Not to do so is to flee from an important area of human behavior and interest and is irresponsible. Indeed, one reason why paranormal beliefs are so prominent today is because religious beliefs are not being critically examined in the marketplace of ideas.

As I have said, I do not believe, however, that CSICOP or the Skeptical Inquirer should in any way, except tangentially, deal with religious issues. But my reasons are pragmatic, not theoretical. It is simply a question of the division of labor. We lack the resources and expertise to focus on the entire range of scientific questions about religion: biblical archaeological, biblical and koranic criticism, linguistics, psychology, anthropology, sociology, the genetic or environmental roots of religion, etc. It would take us too far afield. We have focused on fringe science and specialized in the paranormal, and we have made important contributions here. Skeptical inquiry in principle should apply equally to economics, politics, ethics, and indeed to all fields of human interest. Surely we cannot possibly evaluate each and every claim to truth that arises. My reasons are thus practical.

But at the same time I disagree with those who counsel caution in applying scientific skepticism to the religious domain. In my view science should not be so narrowly construed that it only applies to experimental laboratory work; it should bring in the tools of logical analysis, historical research, and rational investigation. In this sense, I submit, religious claims are amenable to scientific examination and skeptical inquiry.

It is possible for a scientist to apply skeptical, scientific inquiry to his or her own specialty with considerable expertise; yet he or she may not be qualified to apply the same methods of rational inquiry to other fields, and indeed may harbor religious beliefs that lack evidential support. Although disbelief about religious claims is higher among scientists (an estimated 60 percent) than the general population (perhaps 10 percent), some scientists fail to rigorously examine their own religious beliefs. They may use rigorous standards of inquiry in their particular fields of expertise, yet throw caution to the wind when they leap into questions of religious faith.

One last issue: to claim that skepticism is committed only to “methodological naturalism” and not scientific naturalism (which sums up the evidence for the naturalistic world view and critiques the theistic/spiritualistic leap beyond) is, I think, profoundly mistaken. To adopt this neutral stance in the current cultural milieu is a cop-out; for questionable religious claims are proliferating daily and they are not adequately evaluated by skeptical scientists. In my view, we need more skeptical inquirers who possess the requisite expertise and are able to apply their investigative skills to religious claims. Such skeptical inquiry is sorely needed today. It could play a vital role in the debate between religion and science.

Note

1. Paul Kurtz, The New Skepticism: Inquiry and Reliable Knowledge (Amherst, N.Y.: Prometheus Books, 1992).

My introductory essay, “Conflicting or Complementary? Some Introductory Thoughts About Boundaries,” attempts to place the subject in some preliminary context. I hope you will begin with that and then read astronomer Chet Raymo’s poetic and evocative “Celebrating Creation.” The other articles then proceed substantively to explore and round out what to me seems a wonderfully diverse set of examinations.

The authors are distinguished scientists, scholars, educators, and writers. All speak from a commitment to science and scientific skepticism, but they offer an impressively wide spectrum of viewpoints. About half are CSICOP Fellows, half have no SI or CSICOP affiliation. There is no “religion bashing” here. There is steadfast defense of science. There are attempts to define and observe clear-cut boundaries, and also pleas to observe each others’ domains with mutual respect. We strived for thoughtful, informed, forthright considerations of the issues that confront scientists, scholars, teachers, skeptics, religious leaders, and the general public in dealing with often troublesome issues along the borderlands of science and religion.

Why are we doing this? Many reasons. We are both a science magazine and a magazine of ideas. It is true that science restricts itself to explanations that can be inferred from confirmable data. Explanations that cannot be based on empirical evidence are not a part of science.

The Skeptical Inquirer has generally adopted the same position in regard to what we consider our domain. Specific claims that are amenable to empirical examination are fair game to science-based criticism. Science itself has nothing to say about the others. But our subtitle is “The Magazine of Science and Reason,” and reason and philosophical inquiry are also part of our domain. I don't know whether the boundaries between science and religion are any more troubled or awash with controversy than they always have been, but I do know that many scientists and skeptics find these issues both troubling and intriguing. We have had many requests to examine them. I hope and believe that the insights expressed here may help find some common ground for understanding both within the community of scientific skepticism and in working with our friends and neighbors in the wider public.

I expect that these articles will stimulate a variety of fresh discussion of all these issues. We welcome your response. We will publish selected reactions in a future issue. Except for that, we will return to our usual format of diverse examination of the entire gamut of topics and issues of interest to the scientific and skeptical communities.

Day 1: That can't possibly be true.

Day 2: I kind of knew it all along.

The jig was up for religious leaders all over the world, and many decided to come clean. From Britain, the long-suppressed introduction to the King James Bible was released: “This is a booke of instructional tayles for children and the weak of minde, and not to be taken too seriously.” Israeli archaeologists confessed that the Dead Sea Scrolls were a rather crude forgery which contained such glaring anachronisms as “toothpaste,” “steam engine,” and “Phil Silvers.” And Chinese scholars admitted that the chubby smiling Buddha began life as a corporate logo for pickled eel in the third century; he was, in effect, the Bob’s Big Boy of his time.

And so the world began to accept life without God. Christians who had been searching for an excuse to skip church now had a humdinger. Jews could finally eat pork without guilt, and found it didn't taste nearly as good that way. Contrarily, millions of starving Hindus were quite happy to eat the sacred cows which had sauntered through their streets for centuries. By year’s end, India’s leading killer had gone from hunger to hypertension, and the cliché of the portly, red-faced Hindu was born.

All but the most fun religious holidays soon passed into obscurity. Easter: in. Lent: out. Hanukkah stayed, while Yom Kippur was replaced with Hanukkah II. Ramadan, the Moslem period of fasting, sobriety, and sexual abstinence, was shortened from twenty-eight days to twenty-eight seconds. Christmas, which had long ago been stripped of any religious meaning, was virtually unchanged.

All over the world, houses of worship lost their tax-exempt status and were forced to shut down. Mosques became banks, cathedrals were converted into multiplexes. Dozens of small churches were turned into a chain of coffee shops called “St. Arbucks.” They were wildly successful in 2003, and bankrupt a year later.

In 2008, the Catholic Church had a massive going out of business sale, auctioning off all its religious art. The Last Supper now graces the lobby of Mitsubishi International in Osaka. The Sistine Chapel ceiling was moved intact to Trump’s Vaticasino in Atlantic City; cigarette smoke has undone all the restoration work and it now looks worse than ever. Larry Flynt bought the Pieta, and what he’s done with it is too gruesome to speculate on.

The Vatican, now stripped of its treasures, installed a water slide to attract tourists. It didn't work. As for the Pope, he became just another celebrity, famous for being famous. He had a talk show on the USA Network, he did a brandy ad, he cut a country and western album. His infomercial for a vibrating massage chair can be seen on many cable channels at three a.m. He married Linda Evans.

One thing did not happen in the post-God world: there was not a total moral collapse. People who didn't have sex because they were too religious now didn't have sex because they were too ugly. A Dallas man who didn't kill his hated wife out of fear of God, now didn't kill her out of fear of the Texas Department of Corrections. In fact, he never killed her-they remained married for fifty-eight years. In the last six years of his life, the man grew demented and began to think his wife was his mother; he died more in love with her than he could possibly imagine.

And so the Godless world plugged along-people were lustier, greedier, prouder, angrier, more envious, gluttonous, and slothful-but not so much you'd notice. They were also a little happier, until July 18, 2036, when geologists taking deep core samples discovered there really was a Hell and we were all going there.

The term skepticism has a number of meanings, which can sometimes lead to misunderstandings between those who use the word one way and those who interpret it another. Of particular interest, and frequently the focus of such misunderstandings, is the stance of skeptics and organized skepticism toward religion and faith. This article will address that issue by defining the term skepticism as it is used by most local skeptical organizations-at least in the view of the authors.

Let us first recall that this magazine is published by the Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal. The word scientific is emphasized here with good reason-it is not the Committee for Philosophical Discussions or the Committee for Religious Debates. The very name of this organization dedicates itself to scientific investigations. The local groups generally echo this viewpoint-often by stating directly that they are dedicated to the application of the scientific method to paranormal and fringe-science phenomena. We will use the term scientific skeptics to denote those who share this viewpoint.

There are others who believe that religion is a fair topic for skeptical analysis; we will use the term rationalists to denote these, because proponents of this view often promote the idea that atheism, or at least non-theism, and skepticism are both part of the same rationalist philosophy. Under this philosophy, a rationalist takes a materialistic, scientific approach to the world and renounces all superstition. There is no distinction between believing in leprechauns, alien abductions, ESP, reincarnation, or the existence of a god-each equally lacks objective evidence.

From this perspective, separating out the latter two beliefs and labeling them as religion-thereby exempting them from critical analysis-is intellectually dishonest. Rationalists often conclude that such behavior is motivated by a desire to avoid those superstitions that are most prominent in our particular culture out of fear of being excessively controversial. For one who promotes rationalism, the most widespread and sacredly guarded superstitions are the most important ones to oppose, for they have the greatest influence and can therefore do the most harm.

Scientific skepticism, however, defines skepticism more around the principles of scientific investigation than around the broader concept of rationalism. According to this view, there is a meaningful distinction between different kinds of beliefs. Specifically, scientific skepticism addresses testable claims, focusing on those that are controversial because they deal with the paranormal or the fringes of science, areas traditionally lacking adequate scientific rigor.

Untestable Claims

Claims that are not testable are simply outside the realm of science. A good example of this is the old creationist argument that God created the world to appear exactly as if it had evolved naturally over four billion years, fossils and all. This claim is certainly consistent with the evidence, but it makes no predictions that can be tested against future observations. In fact, it is designed to eliminate any observable distinction between an evolved and a created world. It is therefore important to identify such claims as untestable and therefore nonscientific because such claims are worthless to the advancement of knowledge. They cannot, by definition, be eliminated through evidence; therefore they must be banished to a realm outside of science.

What can a scientific skeptics’ group say about such claims? Only that they are outside the realm of science, and that science can have only an agnostic view toward untestable hypotheses. A rationalist may argue that maintaining an arbitrary opinion about an untestable hypothesis is irrational-and he may be right. But this is a philosophical argument, not a scientific one. If an individual makes a personal choice to maintain a belief regarding an untestable hypothesis with no claims to evidence in support of that belief, then there is no scientific basis on which to challenge the belief. It is best labeled faith, which distinguishes it from a belief based on evidence.

The most obvious such belief is a person’s answer to the question, “Does God exist?” There is simply no scientific way to know the answer to this. Certainly many people think they know the answer, and that is satisfying to them. Some have written entire books on why the universe does not need to have a god, but that does not prove that a god is nonexistent. Indeed, any omnipotent being worth his salt should be able to create a universe that doesn't have obvious inconsistencies in it.

So that question comes down purely to faith. Either you believe in a god, or you don't. Science cannot answer that question.

Faith and Science

The real distinction made by scientific skepticism is not between religion and nonreligion, but between faith and science. A faith-based belief may be religious, New Age, paranormal, or even social. Testable religious claims, such as those of creationists, faith healers, and miracle men, however, are amenable to scientific skepticism. Therefore, anyone who claims to have scientific evidence for the existence of God has stepped into the scientific arena and is now open to skeptical criticism. These claims are part of the heart and soul (if you'll excuse the metaphor) of CSICOP and the local skeptics groups. But an individual professing a personal faith in God, who does not try to justify this faith with evidence, is immune to scientific arguments.

One criticism that has been leveled at this view is that we are merely trying to avoid offending people. Certainly, that is one part of it-but not for the reason that charge is leveled. Some rationalists have often assumed that all skeptics must be, like them, nontheists. As we've said, they often do not understand how one can be a skeptic and at the same time hold religious beliefs. Experiences in the local groups, however, show that one can indeed be a skeptic and still be religious. REALL, the Rational Examination Association of Lincoln Land, has among its Patron members a retired reverend and a rabbinical school applicant (along with several outspoken atheists). Other local group leaders have similar examples; one even advertises its meetings in a church newsletter! So it certainly would offend those people to assume all skeptics to be nontheists. They are working to advance the same cause-the same way of thinking-as all the other skeptics are, so why should we push them away?

An argument often advanced against this position is that we do not accept others who hold beliefs contrary to our way of thinking, such as those who believe in astrology or creationism, so why should we treat these people with religious beliefs any differently? Because religious beliefs are beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, there is no more reason to discriminate against those with religious beliefs than there is to discriminate because of race, sexual preference, or political party. None of us would ever think of doing the latter, so why should anybody suggest the former?

Most of the local groups, including REALL and the New England Skeptical Society, officially profess the position of scientific skepticism. The compelling reason for this is that the definition of scientific skepticism provides a sound and internally consistent self-definition. Our roles are clearly defined-to defend science, to promote the scientific method as the best route to reliable knowledge about the universe, to challenge testable claims of a pseudoscientific, paranormal, or otherwise fringe nature, and to promote education, especially of science and critical thinking.

Without such a clearly defined focus, we risk being caught up in activities that may be only tangentially related to scientific skepticism. For example, the majority of our members probably oppose prayer in public schools, may support gay rights, and have strong feelings on abortion, but it is simply not the purpose of our organizations to expend our resources in such directions.

In addition, as a practical aspect to the focus on testable claims, our goal of teaching critical thinking and reason would be greatly hampered if we were perceived as being anti-religious. This single issue, which is not central to our purpose, could potentially drain our resources, monopolize our public image, and alienate many potential skeptics.

We should never be hesitant to scrutinize claims just because they have religious attachments-else we could not look at weeping icons, faith healers, Bible code finders, or fortunetellers who hang crosses in their windows. But systems of faith alone belong to the philosophers, not to the scientific skeptics like us.

The position of scientific skepticism is consistent, pragmatic, and allows the skeptical movement to precisely and confidently define the focus of its mission. Those who would prefer philosophical investigation have many other organizations to draw upon-including one that shares a headquarters building, and many members, with CSICOP. But CSICOP itself must stay true to its name and focus on scientific investigation.